Delegating Powers: A Transaction Cost Politics Approach to Policy Making under Separate Powers - Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions - Epstein, David (Columbia University, New York) - Books - Cambridge University Press - 9780521669603 - November 13, 1999
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Delegating Powers: A Transaction Cost Politics Approach to Policy Making under Separate Powers - Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions

Epstein, David (Columbia University, New York)

Delegating Powers: A Transaction Cost Politics Approach to Policy Making under Separate Powers - Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions

David Epstein and Sharyn O'Halloran produce the first unified theory of policy making between the legislative and executive branches. With implications for the study of constitutional design, political delegation, legislative organization, administrative law, and the role of the executive in policy making, this book redefines the study of legislative-executive relations under separate powers.


340 pages, 34 b/w illus.

Media Books     Paperback Book   (Book with soft cover and glued back)
Released November 13, 1999
ISBN13 9780521669603
Publishers Cambridge University Press
Pages 340
Dimensions 155 × 227 × 21 mm   ·   518 g
Language English  
Series Editor Calvert, Randall