Clausewitz and Seapower: Lessons of the Falkland Islands War

Edward Zellem explores the hypothesis that although Clausewitz has been criticized for not specifically addressing naval warfare in his seminal work "On War," Clausewitzian principles are in fact not only applicable, but highly relevant to the modern conduct of war at sea. The 1982 Falkland Islands conflict between Great Britain and Argentina is used as the framework to examine the hypothesis. As the largest and most significant series of naval engagements since World War II, the Falklands War provides a rich database of both traditional and nontraditional lessons learned about the conduct of War at Sea.

This book begins with a brief discussion of critiques of Clausewitz and his apparent lack of focus on the naval element of warfare. It is followed by a historical review of significant events leading up to, and during the Falkland Islands War. Key events in the war are reviewed and examined within a framework of Clausewitzian principles. The motives, key assumptions, military strategy, and tactics of Great Britain and Argentina are discussed within the context of the Clausewitzian dictum that "war is the continuation of politics by other means." Selected specific events in the campaign are then addressed in terms of Clausewitzian "Principles of War" to determine their relevance or irrelevance to modern naval strategy and campaigning.