Venezuela As an Exporter of 4th Generation Warfare Instability

Publisher Marketing: Almost no one seems to understand the Marxist-Leninist foundations of Hugo Chavez's political thought. It becomes evident, however, in the general vision of his "Bolivarian Revolution." The abbreviated concept is to destroy the old foreign-dominated (U. S. dominated) political and economic systems in the Americas, to take power, and to create a socialist, nationalistic, and "popular" (direct) democracy in Venezuela that would sooner or later extend throughout the Western Hemisphere. Despite the fact that the notion of the use of force (compulsion) is never completely separated from the Leninist concept of destroying any bourgeois opposition, Chavez's revolutionary vision will not be achieved through a conventional military war of maneuver and attrition, or a traditional insurgency. According to Lenin and Chavez, a "new society" will only be created by a gradual, systematic, compulsory application of agitation and propaganda (i.e., agit-prop). That long-term effort is aimed at exporting instability and generating public opinion in favor of a "revolution" and against the bourgeois system. Thus, the contemporary asymmetric revolutionary warfare challenge is rooted in the concept that the North American (U. S.) "Empire" and its bourgeois political friends in Latin America are not doing what is right for the people, and that the socialist Bolivarian philosophy and leadership will. In these terms, regime legitimacy is key to the conflict, and it is public opinion that is the main target of the revolutionary effort. Chavez's vision comes at a time when, despite general economic progress, there are deep flaws in the democratic political systems throughout the Western Hemisphere. Relative popular dissatisfaction stems from deep-rooted socioeconomic inequalities; distrust; and lack of confidence in the police, national legislatures, and political parties. There are also rising popular expectations along with a popular consciousness of currently nonexistent rights. Latin America, now-as in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s-appears to be a revolutionary's dream. Thus, it appears that Hugo Chavez is prepared to help friends, partners, and allies to destabilize, to facilitate the processes of state failure, and to "destroy in order to build" in true revolutionary fashion. Moreover, according to Chavez, it does not matter whether or not he will be able to continue to direct that effort. He states straightforwardly that ." . . independent of my personal destiny, this revolution . . . has gotten its start, and nothing and no one can stop it." Consequently, this book will address four cogent issues operating within the context of President Chavez's grand strategic political-psychological destabilization effort. They are: 1) Hugo Chavez's Bolivarian Vision; 2) Key Components of the Chavez Strategic-Level Asymmetric (4th Generation War) War Model; 3) The Paramilitary Operational Model for Compelling Radical Change in the Western Hemisphere; and, 4) Implications and Recommendations.